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Abstract   
 
We investigate the determinants of US credit union capital-to-assets ratios, before and after 
the implementation of the current capital adequacy regulatory framework in 2000. 
Capitalization varies pro-cyclically, and until the financial crisis credit unions classified as 
adequately capitalized or below followed a faster adjustment path than well capitalized credit 
unions. This pattern was reversed, however, in the aftermath of the crisis. The introduction of 
the PCA regulatory regime achieved a reduction in the proportion of credit unions classified 
as adequately capitalized or below that continued until the onset of the crisis. Since the crisis, 
the speed of recovery of credit unions in this category following an adverse capitalization 
shock was sharply reduced.  
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Regulatory Change and Capital Adjustment of US Credit Unions 
 
1.  Introduction 
During the 2000s (and especially since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007), the role 
of capital in minimizing the impact of unforeseen losses on the part of financial institutions has 
received widespread attention. In this paper we examine the capitalization of US credit unions. 
Credit unions are non-profit, cooperative financial institutions governed by their membership on 
a one-member-one-vote basis, with eligibility for membership defined by the credit union’s 
common bond. At the end of 2012, credit unions accounted for approximately 10% of all 
consumer savings and deposits in the US, servicing over 96 million members drawn from a wide 
cross-section of society.  
Unlike other retail financial institutions, credit unions are not permitted to raise capital by 
issuing new equity. Over time, net worth accumulates through the retention of (tax exempt) 
earnings that are not distributed to members, in the form of dividends on share accounts, or 
favourable rates paid on deposit accounts, or subsidized rates charged on loans.
1
 This implies 
capital shortages cannot be rectified quickly, and suggests that the capital adjustment of credit 
unions may differ from that of commercial banks and non-financial firms.  
Before 2000 US credit unions were not subject to any formal capital (net worth) 
requirements. In 1997, the US Treasury recommended that the National Credit Union 
Association (NCUA), the regulator, introduce specific net worth requirements in the form of 
                                                 
1
 The tax exemption affords credit unions a competitive advantage over banks and other mutual financial services 
providers, and has assisted the credit union industry in maintaining capitalization substantially higher than the 
minimum regulatory level (US Government Accountability Office, 2005). Large capital buffers might be maintained 
as a means of signalling strength to depositors or the regulator. The tax-exempt status of US credit unions has been 
justified by its proponents as a policy tool to tackle financial exclusion. An August 2010 report (and several previous 
reports) on tax reform suggests it might be appropriate for credit unions to be subject to corporate taxation (US 
Government Accountability Office, 2005; The President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, 2010).  
 1 
defined minima for capital-to-assets ratios (US Treasury, 1997). Under a new Prompt Corrective 
Action (PCA) regime introduced in 2000, a range of mandatory and supervisory actions (such as 
restricting dividends paid to members and dismissing the credit union management) were applied 
to undercapitalized credit unions in order to restore net worth.  
Under these regulatory arrangements, US credit unions have, in general, withstood the 
financial crisis of the late-2000s better than many banks (Smith and Woodbury, 2010).
2
 
Nevertheless, the reported payouts of the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund 
(NCUSIF) in respect of credit union failures were $985 million in 2008 and 2009 combined, 
$221 million in 2010, $54.9 million in 2011, and $207 million in the first half of 2012. In the 
light of these developments, an analysis of the capitalization of credit unions is highly relevant 
for the ongoing debate concerning the future regulation of financial institutions. 
Utilizing credit union level semi-annual data compiled from Call Reports published by 
the NCUA for the period June 1994 to December 2012 and state-level macroeconomic data from 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, we estimate a panel sample-selection model, comprising a 
probit regression for the probability of survival for each credit union in each six-month period, 
and a fixed-effects regression for the change in the capital-to-assets ratio. This allows us to 
examine the capital-adjustment process, and the speed and pattern of recovery from any adverse 
capitalization shock. We also examine the effects of the PCA regime introduced in 2000 (by 
classifying credit unions by their capitalization and sub-dividing the observation period into 
relevant sub-periods), and the effects of credit union-specific and macroeconomic factors on 
capitalization. We subdivide the post-2000 period into two further sub-periods (2000-08 and 
                                                 
2
 Historically, losses imposed on insurance funds have been lower for credit unions than for banks (Kane and 
Hendershott, 1996; Wilcox, 2005a). 
 2 
2009-12), in recognition of a sharp deterioration in credit union capitalization that followed the 
financial crisis.  
 Key empirical findings are as follows. Until the financial crisis, credit unions classified 
as adequately capitalized or below followed a faster adjustment path following an adverse 
capitalization shock than their well capitalized counterparts. This pattern was reversed, however, 
in the aftermath of the crisis. The introduction of the PCA regulatory regime coincided with a 
sustained reduction in the proportion of credit unions classified as adequately capitalized or 
below, which continued until the onset of the crisis. Since the crisis, credit union capitalization 
has deteriorated, and the speed of recovery of credit unions classified as adequately capitalized 
or below following an adverse capitalization shock has been sharply reduced. Increases in credit 
union lending naturally tend to reduce capitalization, which varies pro-cyclically. In the absence 
of any option to raise new capital in the form of equity, credit unions tend to manage their capital 
cautiously over the business cycle. The probability of survival is increasing in size, but 
decreasing in age. A high capital-to-assets ratio or a high loans-to-assets ratio increases the 
probability of survival, but a high liquid assets-to-total assets ratio reduces the probability of 
survival. During the late-2000s, large credit unions experienced a smaller reduction in their 
capitalization, on average, than small credit unions.  
In summary, this study provides new insights into the factors that determine the capital 
held by credit unions, the relationship between state-level macroeconomic conditions and credit 
union capitalization, and the impact of a major regulatory change on capital management and 
capital adjustment. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
evolution of capital adequacy regulation of US credit unions. Section 3 reviews the literature on 
capital adequacy regulation and capital management for both banks and credit unions. Section 4 
 3 
describes the empirical model, while Section 5 describes the data, and reports descriptive 
statistics. Section 6 reports and interprets the empirical findings. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Capital adequacy regulation of credit unions 
Capital requirements for credit unions are set by statute which requires Congress to 
revisit capital requirements as economic and financial conditions change (Wilcox, 2011). In 
1934, Congress set capital requirements as a percentage of earnings to be added to reserves at the 
end of each year. In 1949, Congress allowed credit unions to forgo accumulating more capital 
once they met higher predetermined capital-to-deposit ratios. With the establishment in 1970 of 
share insurance for credit unions, Congress introduced a number of changes (the capital-to-
deposit ratio was changed to a capital-to-assets ratio and the formula for the amount of capital to 
be set aside was altered from a fraction of net earnings to a fraction of gross earnings) that 
effectively lowered capital requirements.
3
 Not until the passage of the Credit Union Membership 
Access Act (CUMAA) in 1998 did Congress eventually enact minimum capital-to-assets 
requirements for credit unions. The introduction of a minimum capital-to-assets requirement was 
not a response to any crisis or emergency among credit unions, but rather it formed part of a 
wide-ranging overhaul of the credit union regulatory system.
4
 
  The PCA framework, included in Section 301 of CUMAA 1998 and implemented in 
August 2000, defines five categories of capitalization, in terms of the ratio of net worth-to-assets, 
                                                 
3
 Insured credit unions are more highly capitalized, more liquid and take fewer risks than their non-insured 
counterparts (Karels and McClatchey, 1999). By contrast, increased access to deposit insurance provides perverse 
incentives for banks to undertake riskier investments, increasing the probability of bank failure (O’Hara and Shaw, 
1990).  
 
4
 In addition to establishing minimum capital-to-assets requirements, CUMAA 1998 grandfathered the fields of 
membership expansions that the NCUA had previously granted to credit unions, introduced restrictions on credit 
union member business lending and permitted conversion of credit unions into mutual savings banks. See Walter 
2006 and Wilcox 2011 for an extended discussion.  
 4 
denoted KA: well capitalized, KA7%; adequately capitalized, 6%KA6.99%; 
undercapitalized, 4%KA5.99%; significantly undercapitalized, 2%KA3.99%; and critically 
undercapitalized, KA<2%. Credit unions classified as well capitalized are free from supervisory 
intervention. Credit unions classified as adequately capitalized or below are required to take 
steps to restore net worth to adequate levels.
5
 Most credit unions are low risk, due to restrictions 
on their activities embodied in cooperative principles and the common bond. However, the 
system of PCA does not differentiate between high- and low-risk institutions. Consequently, 
low-risk credit unions may tend to hold excessive amounts of capital. Since credit unions cannot 
issue equity and do not have access to supplemental capital the current system leaves credit 
unions exposed to automatic regulatory PCA intervention if there is an unexpected large growth 
in assets that outweighs any increase in net worth.  This was evidenced in 2001, when financial 
market uncertainty resulted in large outflows of funds from stock and bond markets, and a 
consequent increase in credit union deposits. The pressure on capitalization caused some credit 
unions to reduce their assets base (by reducing lending), convert to community banks (where 
there is greater flexibility in raising capital) or merge with more strongly capitalized credit 
unions.
6
  
In 1994 the proportion of credit unions classified as adequately capitalized or below 
(post-2000 terminology), with capital-to-assets ratios below 7%, was as high as 8.3%. In 
anticipation of the new regulatory arrangements, the proportion of credit unions classified as 
                                                 
5
 The CUMAA specifies mandatory actions for credit unions that do not meet capital adequacy standards. These 
include: annual earnings retentions of at least 0.4% of total assets; the submission and adherence to a net worth 
restoration plan (NWRP); lending restrictions; and the prohibition of increases in assets until net worth is restored. 
The CUMAA allows the NCUA to use 14 supervisory actions to supplement the mandatory actions.  
 
6
 Wilcox (2011), analysing the recent crisis period, argues that as a result of capital pressures many credit unions 
have been forced to limit their traditional role as safe harbours for depositors, accommodating less deposit growth 
than during and after past recessions, and reducing their lending substantially. In addition some credit unions have 
been forced to ask large depositors to temporarily shift their deposits elsewhere.  
 5 
adequately capitalized or below fell to 3.2% in 1999, and reached a low of 1.4% in 2007. There 
was a sharp increase to 5.2% in 2009, which has since been partially reversed through a 
reduction to 3.6% in 2012. Capitalization is inversely related to asset size: in 2012 the average 
capital-to-assets ratio of the largest 10% of credit unions was 10.5% compared to 19.4% for the 
smallest 10% of credit unions. Jackson (2007) suggests that in comparison with banks, US credit 
unions in general are overcapitalized.  
The US Senate (December, 2010) instructed the Government Accountability Office to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the NCUA’s regulatory arrangements, for both insured credit unions 
and corporate credit unions. The ensuing report concluded that the NCUA should consider 
additional triggers for PCA that would require early and forceful regulatory action and make 
recommendations to Congress for the modification of PCA (US Government Accountability 
Office, 2012).
7
 In 2013, legislative amendments have been proposed to allow credit unions to 
manage their balance sheets more effectively. H.R. 2572, the ‘Regulatory Relief for Credit 
Unions Act of 2013’ calls for the introduction of a risk-based regulatory system, which 
effectively reduces the level of required capital. H.R. 719, the ‘Capital Access for Small 
Businesses and Jobs Act of 2013’ provides for additional capital flexibility with federal credit 
unions permitted to receive payments on uninsured, non-share capital accounts, provided the 
accounts are offered by a credit union that is sufficiently well capitalized. 
 
 
                                                 
7
 US Government Accountability Office (2011) notes that the effectiveness of PCA for banks was limited because of 
its reliance on capital, which can lag behind other indicators of financial health. Problems with a bank’s assets, 
earnings or management typically manifest before these problems affect capital levels. Consequently, once an 
institution falls below PCA capital standards, it may be unable to recover regardless of the regulatory action 
imposed. 
 
 6 
3.  Literature review 
Marcus (1981) examines the determinants of capital-to-assets ratios for US banks for the 
period 1965-77, using a partial-adjustment model.
8
 Target capital-to-assets ratios depend on 
regulatory pressure. Using a simultaneous-equations model, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) examine 
the relationship between leverage, capital requirements and risk for the period 1983-87, and 
report a positive relationship between capital and risk. Banks operating below the regulatory 
minimum capital-to-assets ratio (at that time 7%) increased their capital more quickly than those 
operating above the minimum. Jacques and Nigro (1997) examine the impact of risk-based 
capital standards for US banks introduced in 1991, during their first year of enforcement, when 
capitalization was increased and exposure to risk was reduced.  
Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) examine the impact of PCA on bank capitalization and 
portfolio risk. During the period 1990-93 capital-to-assets ratios increased and risks were 
reduced following the introduction of new capital standards and PCA. Undercapitalized banks 
adjusted faster than those that were adequately capitalized. Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, Lee and 
Oztekin (2008) model the capital adjustment of US publicly-traded bank holding companies 
(BHC) for the period 1992-2006. BHCs set target capital levels substantially above the 
regulatory minima and BHCs with relatively weak capitalization adjust rapidly towards their 
targets.
9
 
                                                 
8
 The influence of firm-specific, industry, legal and institutional factors on the capital structure of non-financial 
firms in the US and elsewhere is examined by Rajan and Zingales (1995), MacKay and Phillips (2005), Flannery 
and Rangan (2006), Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008), Cook and Tang (2010), Hovakimian and Li (2011), and 
Oztekin and Flannery (2012). 
 
9
 Outside the US, Brewer, Kaufman and Wall (2008) find that the capitalization of the largest international banks 
during 1992-2005 was highest in countries with effective corporate governance laws, and where PCA was enforced. 
Gropp and Heider (2010) report that the market-to-book ratio, profitability and asset size are important in 
determining the capital structure of large US and European banks during the period 1991-2004. Regulatory 
constraints are of less importance than market variables in determining capital structure.  
 
 7 
Recent attention has focused on the role of capital buffers in absorbing shocks arising 
from unanticipated changes in credit risk. Bank lending is pro-cyclical, but credit risk is counter-
cyclical: defaults tend to increase during economic downturns. The lending practices of banks 
may contribute to upturns (relaxed credit standards and excessive lending) and downturns 
(tighter credit standards, and increased capitalization to mitigate insolvency risk). Capital 
regulation that requires banks to increase capitalization during downturns may accentuate this 
effect.
10
 Alternatively, banks could target lower capitalization during downturns in order to 
maintain lending relationships, at the cost of increasing default probabilities (Berger, DeYoung, 
Flannery, Lee and Oztekin, 2008).  
A few studies examine the impact of capital regulation for credit unions.
11
 Jackson (2007) 
examines the capitalization of US credit unions during the period 1990-2006. The average 
capitalization at the end of 2006 was 11.6%, four percentage points higher than the 
corresponding figure in 1990. Using bank capitalization as a benchmark, Jackson suggests that 
credit unions were overcapitalized by 30-40% (between $8.8 billion and $11.7 billion) in 2006. 
Smith and Woodbury (2010) compare the financial stability of US banks and credit unions 
during the period 1986-2009. Credit unions are less sensitive to the business cycle than banks. 
The balance sheets of both tend to deteriorate when unemployment rises, but the trajectory and 
magnitude of delinquencies and charge-offs at banks are more pronounced. This suggests that in 
order to account for this lower risk, capital ratios for credit unions could be reduced relative to 
their banking counterparts.  
                                                 
10
 According to Cook and Tang (2010), the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the dynamics of capital 
adjustment has been neglected in the empirical literature. 
 
11
 Bogan (2012) examines the link between capital structure and operational self-sufficiency for microfinance 
institutions located in Africa, East Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and South Asia for the 
period 2003-2006.  
 8 
Hillier, Hodgson, Stevenson-Clarke, and Lhaopadchan (2008) examine the responses of 
Australian credit unions during the period 1987-94 to the imposition of new capital adequacy 
regulations. There is evidence that accounting window-dressing techniques were used to adjust 
reported capital ratios. Brown and Davis (2009) examine the capital management of Australian 
credit unions during the period 1993-2006. Some credit unions managed their capitalization by 
setting a short-run target for return on assets, with the intention of gradually eliminating 
discrepancies between actual and desired capital ratios.  
 
4. Empirical model specification 
An important feature of the empirical model used in this study is the inclusion of a 
control for survivorship bias in the capital-adjustment equation. Capital adjustment in each 
period is observed only for those credit unions that survive, but capitalization is expected to be a 
key determinant of the probability of survival, creating a non-zero expectation conditional on 
survival for the disturbance term of the capital-adjustment equation. Attrition features 
prominently in the recent corporate demography of US credit unions, with the total number of 
institutions having decreased by over one-third during the 1994-2012 observation period for this 
study. Accordingly, we estimate the capital-adjustment equation using the Heckman (1979) 
sample-selection model, including a probit regression for the probabilities of survival or 
disappearance for each credit union in each six-month time period.
12
  
 The data used in the present study is of exceptionally high quality, providing virtually 
100% coverage of the US credit union industry, excluding privately-insured credit unions, over a 
                                                 
12
 This approach addresses a shortcoming of a recent analysis of the capital dynamics of non-financial firms: “A 
more thorough investigation of the survivorship issue would entail a model of firm exit and an appropriate 
identification strategy, i.e. instrument(s), to disentangle the exit decision from the capital structure decision … a 
potentially fruitful area for future research” (Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008, p1581).  
 9 
19-year period. We are able to track attrition in the population to a very high level of accuracy, 
with a cause of disappearance being identified for 99.4% of all non-survivors, and the acquiring 
credit union being identified for 98.8% of credit unions that exited as a result of acquisition 
(which account for 89.9% of all exits). For credit unions that were involved in M&A transactions 
in any six-month period as acquirers, we are able to adjust the lagged variables used in the 
capital-adjustment equation by creating lagged values for a ‘synthetic’ credit union based on the 
aggregate net worth of the acquirer and the acquired credit union.  
The availability of data both before and after the introduction of the current regulatory 
arrangements for PCA in 2000 enables us to identify the effect of this major regulatory change 
on the capital adjustment of US credit unions. The empirical model incorporates coefficients that 
reflect the speed and time-path of capital adjustment, before and after this regulatory event and 
during the aftermath of the financial crisis of the late-2000s. Impulse response functions are 
employed to identify the adjustment paths of well capitalized credit unions, and credit unions 
classified as adequately capitalized or below.  
The specification of the capital-adjustment equation allows for different intercepts and 
different patterns of dependence of ki,t on ki,t–1 and ki,t–m (for m=1,2) for credit unions that 
were well capitalized (ki,t–10.07) and those that were adequately capitalized or below (ki,t–
1<0.07), for each of three sub-periods: 1995-2000 (before the introduction of PCA); 2000-08 
(from the introduction of PCA to the financial crisis); and 2009-12 (in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis).  
The specification of the empirical model is as follows.  
Survivorship equation: 
 
s
t,i,ss1t,i71t,i61t,i51t,i41t,i31t,i21t,i1
*
t,i Daexnqksy             [1] 
 10 
Capital-adjustment equation:   
ki,t = intercept +  


6
1j
2t,i121t,i112t,i
j
121t,i
j
111t,i
j
1
j
t,i cc)kkk(I  
t,ii2t,i421t,i412t,i321t,i312t,i221t,i21 ggeenn              [2] 
In [2], vi,t ~ N(0,
2
v ); and i is an individual effect specific to credit union i. Conditional upon 
credit union i having been live at time t–1, credit union i survived until time t and ki,t was 
observed, if 0uy t,i
*
t,i  , where ui,t ~ N(0,1). Credit union i failed to survive to time t if 
0uy t,i
*
t,i  . 
Survivorship depends on assets size (s), capitalization (k), liquidity (q), non-performing 
loans ratio (n), loans-to-assets ratio (x), non-interest expenses-to-assets ratio (e) and age (a). The 
change in capitalization (k) depends on growth in loans (c), change in the non-performing 
loans ratio (n), change in the ratio of non-interest expenses-to-assets (e) and growth in gross 
state product (g).13 Table 1 lists the variable definitions in full.   
Conditional on ki,t–1 having been observed, ki,t is observed with probability )y(
*
t,i  and 
unobserved with probability )y(1 * t,i , where  and  are the density function and distribution 
function of the standard normal distribution. The issue of survivorship bias in the fixed-effects 
capital-adjustment equation arises because the dependent variable is observed only for credit 
unions that survived each six-month period. Unobservables that influence the capital-to-assets 
ratio might also influence the survival probability, rendering the disturbance term of the capital-
adjustment equation non-random in the absence of a sample-selection correction. A non-random 
                                                 
13
 Goddard, McKillop and Wilson (2002) and Wilcox (2005a,b; 2006) report evidence that larger credit unions are 
more efficient and more robust than their smaller counterparts. Goddard, McKillop and Wilson (2009) examine the 
determinants of credit union acquisition. Wheelock and Wilson (2011) suggest that future deregulation permitting 
credit unions to expand their range of activities will lead to further growth and efficiency improvements.  
 11 
disturbance term implies the standard ordinary least squares or fixed-effects estimators will 
produce biased estimates of the coefficients of the capital-adjustment equation.  
The sample-selection correction can be implemented by augmenting [2] with the non-
selection hazard, measured by the inverse Mills ratio )y(/)y( * t,i
*
t,i  . To incorporate the latter 
into a fixed-effects regression, Vella (1998) recommends estimating a series of cross-sectional 
probit regressions for survival or non-survival in each time period, and constructing the inverse 
Mills ratio variable for inclusion in the fixed-effects regression from these probit regressions.
14
 A 
positive coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio in the augmented capital-adjustment equation is 
consistent with the hypothesis that a random event or unobservable that has a positive effect on 
capitalization also tends to have a positive effect on the probability of survival. We estimate a 
single pooled probit regression for survival with a full set of time dummies, and covariates that 
are important in driving survival or disappearance in previous studies.
15
  
In dynamic panels with small T, fixed-effects estimation is biased, owing to the presence 
among the covariates of the lagged dependent variable. In such cases, a Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimator is usually recommended (Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The bias in the fixed-effects estimator 
diminishes as T increases, while the GMM estimator rapidly becomes unwieldy due to a 
proliferation of lagged values of the dependent variable and covariates that qualify for inclusion 
                                                 
14
 In the present case, the ability of cross-sectional probit regressions to explain survival or non-survival is variable, 
and the estimated coefficients are unstable, owing to the relatively small proportion of disappearances (around 1.5% 
of the total population) in each six-monthly period (see Table 5). A pooled probit regression with time-period 
dummies allows a sufficient number of exits for reliable estimation. It seems plausible that there might well be a 
cyclical pattern in the rate of credit union acquisition, by far the largest exit category. The time-period dummies in 
the probit regression are highly significant. 
 
15
 The role of bank-specific, regulatory and regional economic conditions as determinants of bank failure is 
examined by Wheelock and Wilson (2000) and Cole and White (2012). The limited evidence on credit union failure 
suggests that young and small credit unions, and those that are weakly capitalized, are most likely to fail (Wilcox, 
2005a; Goddard, McKillop and Wilson, 2009).  
 
 12 
as instruments.
16
 In the present case, the availability of more than 30 observations on each 
surviving credit union renders the bias in the fixed-effects estimator sufficiently small to be 
ignored.
17
 Accordingly, we estimate the capital-adjustment equation using fixed effects. The use 
of lagged values of all covariates partially mitigates the endogeneity problem that might arise 
through simultaneity between the contemporaneous values of the capital-to-assets ratio and other 
financial ratios.
18
 
Lagged values are used for the covariates of the capital-adjustment equation, to avoid 
possible endogeneity issues. The growth in loans ci,t-m controls for the effects of an increase in 
lending on the capital-to-assets ratio. In addition to a natural tendency for growth in lending to 
place downward pressure on the capital-to-assets ratio through an increase in the assets 
denominator, empirical evidence suggests that periods of rapid loan growth tend to be followed 
by increased defaults, and consequent depletion of capital (Berger and Udell, 2004).  
The change in the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans ni,t-m is a proxy for credit 
risk. We expect an increase in the non-performing loans ratio to be associated with a subsequent 
decrease in the capital-to-assets ratio, as capital is depleted by the losses arising from the 
eventual write-off of non-performing loans. The change in the non-interest expenses to assets 
ratio ei,t-1 reflects an anticipated tendency for a credit union with high operating costs to 
                                                 
16
 The number of lags of the dependent variable, and the number of lags of the predetermined, endogenous or strictly 
exogenous variables, that are available for inclusion in the instrument matrix (either in levels or in first differences) 
naturally increases as the time dimension of the panel increases.   
 
17
 Flannery and Hankins (2013) report Monte Carlo simulation evidence for the order of magnitude of the bias in the 
fixed-effects estimator of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, as follows: 0.144 for T=6, 0.070 for 
T=12 and 0.026 for T=30.  
 
18
 If both the covariates and the disturbances of [2] are autocorrelated, simultaneity bias may arise despite the use of 
lagged covariates. Owing to an absence of suitable instruments capable of satisfying the instrument relevance and 
instrument exogeneity conditions among the Call Report data, an instrumental variables treatment of the possible 
simultaneity problem affecting the estimation of [2] is not possible in this study. 
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encounter difficulties in maintaining adequate capitalization. Excessive operating costs deplete 
net income, making it difficult to increase capital in line with growth in lending. 
The growth in Gross State Product gi,t-m controls for the effects of variations in state-
level macroeconomic conditions. A state-level geographic definition is employed, since most 
credit unions operate within defined geographic boundaries. The theoretical relationship between 
capital buffers and the business cycle is unclear. Forward-looking financial institutions might 
accumulate capital during an upturn, to protect against losses during a future downturn. 
Alternatively, myopic institutions might deplete capital during an upturn by exploiting transient 
lending and other investment opportunities to the full. During a downturn, the same institutions 
might be pressed to raise new capital in a climate of increasing loan defaults and write-offs.
19
 
For 4,907 of the 4,947 credit unions identified as having been either acquired or subject 
to a purchase and assumption order, an acquiring credit union is identified by the NCUA.
20
 The 
acquisition of another credit union is likely to affect the capital adjustment of the acquirer. For 
example, if the acquired credit union is undercapitalized relative to the acquirer, then some 
reduction in the capitalization of the acquirer is to be expected when the balance sheets of 
acquirer and acquired are combined. To control for this effect, synthetic first-difference and 
lagged values of the variables ki,t, ci,t, ni.t and ei,t for the acquirer credit union are constructed for 
                                                 
19
 Recent research has focused on the role of capital buffers in absorbing shocks to a bank’s capital base. The results 
of studies that examine the link between bank capital buffers and economic growth are mixed. On balance, however, 
it appears that commercial banks’ capital is negatively related to economic growth (Ayuso, Perez and Saurina, 2004; 
Lindquist, 2004). This is not the case for savings and cooperatives banks, which appear to build capital during 
periods of economic growth (Stolz and Wedow, 2011). Smith and Woodbury’s (2010) comparison of the loan 
performance of banks and credit unions over the period 1986-2009 suggests that credit union loan delinquencies and 
net charge-offs are less affected by macroeconomic fluctuations (unemployment rate) than those of banks. 
 
20
 For the remaining 40 acquisitions, we were unable to identify the acquiring credit union. Most of these 
acquisitions were small. We consider the effects of this omission on the estimation results to be negligible.  
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the periods immediately following the acquisition, using the combined data for the acquirer and 
the acquired credit unions immediately prior to the acquisition.
21
  
 
5.  Data and descriptive statistics 
The balance sheet and income statement data used in the empirical analysis reported in 
this study are compiled from the ‘5300 Call Reports’, published by the NCUA. Semi-annual data 
are available for the period June 1994 to December 2012 inclusive, providing a maximum of 38 
time-series observations on each credit union. NCUA reports data for 12,046 credit unions in 
December 1994, and 6,814 credit unions in December 2012.
22
 State-level macroeconomic data 
are obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Table 2 reports the total number of US credit unions at the end of December in each year 
from 1994 to 2012, with averages of the variables employed in the capital-adjustment model. 
Over the period there was a pronounced decline (43%) in credit union numbers, balanced by a 
large increase (519%) in average asset size. The average capital-to-assets ratio increased by 
about three percentage points between 1994 and 2007, but has subsequently fallen sharply. 
Capitalization appears to be pro-cyclical: the average capital-to-assets ratio declined from 14.8% 
                                                 
21
 For the semi-annual observation immediately following an acquisition, ki,t is the capital-to-assets ratio for the 
acquirer, incorporating the capital and the assets of the acquired credit union. The constructed value of ki,t for the 
acquirer is ki,t–
*
1t,ik  , where 
*
1t,ik   is the synthetic capital-assets ratio of the acquirer and the acquired before the 
acquisition, [(NW
acquirer
+NW
acquired
)/(ASSET
acquirer
+ASSET
acquired
)]t–1. The constructed values of ki,t–1, ki,t–1 and ki,t–
2 for the acquirer are 
*
1t,ik  , 
*
1t,ik  –
*
2t,ik   and 
*
2t,ik  –
*
3t,ik  , respectively. For the next semi-annual observation, 
ki,t and ki,t–1 are the actual values for the acquirer incorporating the acquired, and the constructed values of ki,t–1 
and ki,t–2 are ki,t–1–
*
2t,ik   and 
*
2t,ik  –
*
3t,ik  , respectively. For the following observation, ki,t, ki,t–1 and ki,t–1 are 
the actual values, and the constructed value of ki,t–2 is ki,t–2–
*
3t,ik  . The other covariates are treated in the same 
manner. 
 
22
 The analysis is undertaken using semi-annual data. Before 2001 credit unions with assets of less than $50 million 
were not formally required to file quarterly reports. In 2001, the NCUA instituted a new Examination Scheduling 
Program, which required all federally-insured credit unions to file a quarterly Call Report (5300 report).   
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in 1999 to 13.3% in 2003; and from 15.5% in 2007 to 13.1% in 2012. Liquidity ratios increased 
significantly following the introduction of PCA. The non-performing loans ratio has declined 
gradually over time, but has seen an upturn during the current financial crisis peaking at 4.02% 
in 2010 before declining in both 2011 and 2012. The rate of growth in loans is sensitive to the 
economic cycle. There were marked reductions in the rate of loan growth in 1998 (Asian crisis), 
2001-2003 (post-‘dotcom’ bubble), and 2007-2012 (financial crisis and aftermath). In this latter 
period annual loan growth was negative in three of the five years.  
Table 3 reports an analysis of the proportions of credit unions in bands defined by the 
capital-to-assets ratio. Of key interest is the trend in the proportion of credit unions that are 
classified as adequately capitalized or below, with capital-to-assets ratios below 7%. In 
December 1994 this proportion was as high as 8.3%, but in anticipation of the introduction of 
capital regulation and PCA, the proportion fell, to around 3% by the end of the 1990s. The 
downward trend continued to a low of 1.4% in December 2007. In 2009, however, the proportion 
of credit unions classified as adequately capitalized or below increased, from 2% in December 
2008 to 5.2% in December 2009. Subsequently some progress has been achieved in reducing this 
proportion, which had fallen to 3.6% by December 2012. Between 2007 and 2012, however, the 
proportion of credit unions reporting capital-to-assets ratios in excess of 16% fell from 35.4% to 
20.5%. 
Table 4 reports the distribution of US credit unions by assets size at each December data-
point, and the average capital-to-assets ratio in each assets size band. Throughout the observation 
period, there is a consistent inverse relationship between assets size and capitalization. Without 
exception, the average capital-to-assets ratio declined in each assets size band between 2007 and 
2012. 
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Table 5 reports an analysis of entry and exits. The reduction in credit union numbers from 
12,046 in 1994 to 6,814 in 2012 forms part of a longer-term decline, from a peak in numbers at 
23,866 in 1969. Between 1994 and 2012, 154 credit unions entered, and 5,386 exited. Most exits 
were as a consequence of acquisition (4,857 credit unions). The annual exit rate was smaller 
during the period 1995 to 1998 than it was in most subsequent years. Between 1999 and 2012 the 
exit rate, with the exception of 2010, has remained broadly stable (between 3% and 4% per 
year), and apparently insensitive to the economic cycle.  
 
6.  Dynamic panel model for survival and capital adjustment 
Table 6 reports the estimation results for the probit regression for the probability of 
survival.
23
 Coefficients significantly different from zero are obtained for all covariates. Larger 
credit unions are more likely to survive than smaller ones, and younger credit unions are more 
likely to survive than older ones.
24
 Other characteristics that increase the probability of survival 
are: a high capital-to-assets ratio; a low liquidity ratio; a low non-performing loans ratio; a high 
loans-to-assets ratio; and a low ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets.
25
 Table 7 reports the 
                                                 
23
 Most credit unions that exited did so as a consequence of having been acquired. Credit unions that failed or were 
subject to a purchase and assumption order account for a very small proportion of total exits (see Table 5). For the 
estimation of the probit regression of survival or disappearance we combine all disappearances into one exit 
category. This suggests that the estimation results are driven mainly by the preponderance of mergers. In a study of 
the corporate demography of the credit union industry, Goddard, McKillop and Wilson (2014) identify some 
differences in the relative importance of factors driving disappearance through acquisition and disappearance 
through failure.  
 
24
 That older credit unions are at greater risk of disappearance has been found elsewhere in the credit union 
literature. For example Barron, West and Hannan (1994), who examine the corporate demography of credit unions 
in New York, find that older credit unions fail at a faster rate than their younger counterparts. The authors attribute 
this pattern to either liability of obsolescence, or liability of senescence, or both.  
 
25
 We find a higher liquidity ratio leads to disappearance (the numerator of our liquidity ratio is defined as cash on 
hand, cash on deposit and cash equivalents) and a low loan to assets ratio also leads to disappearance. An 
explanation for these findings is that a credit union that hordes cash, or does not create a loans portfolio of a size 
commensurate with its deposits, may be either an attractive target for an acquirer that believes itself capable of 
earning a higher return by expanding the loans portfolio, or at risk of failure due to an inability to generate an 
adequate return. 
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estimation results for the fixed-effects capital-adjustment equation, in which the dependent 
variable is the change in the capital-to-assets ratio over each six-month period. 
 
6.1  Dynamics of capital adjustment 
The first column of Table 7 reports a pooled estimation using the data for all credit 
unions. The coefficients on 1t,i
j
t,i kI  , 1t,i
j
t,i kI   and 2t,i
j
t,i kI   describe capital adjustment 
separately for credit unions in the following categories: well capitalized (ki,t–10.07), 1995.2-
2000.1 (j=1); adequately capitalized or below (ki,t–1<0.07), 1995.2-2000.1 (j=2); well capitalized, 
2000.2-2008.2 (j=3); adequately capitalized or below, 2000.2-2008.2 (j=4); well capitalized, 
2009.1-2012.2 (j=5); adequately capitalized or below, 2009.1-2012.2 (j=6).
26
 By classifying 
credit unions by their capitalization and sub-dividing the observation period into pre-and post-
2000 sub-periods, we identify the impact on capital adjustment of the introduction of the current 
regulatory arrangements for PCA. The further sub-division of post-2000 into two sub-periods 
(2000-08, and 2009-12) recognizes the sharp deterioration in credit union capitalization in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis (see Tables 2, 3 and 4), and allows for further differences in the 
pattern of capital adjustment between these sub-periods. Along with the test for the joint 
significance of all coefficients, tests of the null hypothesis of equality of corresponding 
coefficients on 1t,i
j
t,i kI  , 1t,i
j
t,i kI   and 2t,i
j
t,i kI   for j=1 and 2 (well capitalized credit unions 
compared with those adequately capitalized and below, 1995-2000), j=3 and 4 (same 
comparison, 2000-08), j=5 and 6 (same comparison, 2009-12), j=1,3 and 5 (well capitalized 
compared across 1995-2000, 2000-08 and 2009-12), and j=2,4 and 6 (adequately capitalized and 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
26
 For convenience, we refer below to the three sub-periods as 1995-2000, 2000-08 and 2009-12.  
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below compared across the same three sub-periods), are reported at the foot of Table 7. The null 
hypothesis is rejected in every case, indicating that the differences between the estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant. 
The interpretation of the coefficients reported in Table 7 may be simplified by 
transforming the estimated coefficients to recover the implied coefficients on ki,t–1, ki,t–2 and ki,t–3 
in the equivalent levels autoregression for ki,t. With reference to [2], the coefficients on mt,i
j
t,i kI   
for m=1,...,3 and j=1,...,6, denoted jm , are as follows: 1
j
11
j
1
j
1  , 
j
12
j
11
j
2   and 
j
12
j
3  . Table 8 reports 
j
m , based on the estimation using the data for all credit unions (first 
column of Table 7), and the corresponding impulse response functions (IRF). The IRF identify 
the impact on ki,t at selected values of t1, of the injection into [2] of an unanticipated negative 
unit capitalization shock of vi,t = –1 at t=0. Figure 1 illustrates the hypothetical adjustment paths 
following a capitalization shock of a credit union that is initially classified as well capitalized, for 
each of the three sub-periods. Figure 2 refers to a credit union initially classified as adequately 
capitalized or below.  
According to Table 8, the time-series behaviour of the capital-to-assets ratio is mean-
reverting, because 0j1  (or 1
3
1m
j
m 

) in all six cases (j=1,...,6). In Figures 1 and 2, the rate of 
mean reversion measure 

3
1m
j
m  is represented by the total area between the IRF and the 
horizontal axis (over time to infinity), which provides a measure of the total exposure (the 
summation over time of the amounts by which the credit union was undercapitalized in each 
period). For any given rate of mean reversion, the relative magnitudes of the individual jm  
convey further information about the nature of the adjustment. If, for example, j1  is relatively 
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large and j2 , 
j
3  are relatively small (or negative), in the early stages recovery is relatively 
slow, but full recovery is achieved relatively fast. By contrast, if j1  is smaller and 
j
2 , 
j
3  are 
larger, in the early stages recovery is relatively fast, but full recovery takes longer.  
For well capitalized credit unions (ki,t–10.07), the adjustment to a negative capitalization 
shock is similar in all three sub-periods. For credit unions that were adequately capitalized or 
below, (ki,t–1<0.07), the adjustment (rate of mean reversion) was faster for the sub-periods 1995-
2000 and 2000-08 than for the sub-period 2009-12.
27
 According to the estimations for the sub-
periods 1995-2000 and 2000-08, if a credit union that is initially adequately capitalized or below 
experiences a negative capitalization shock, the adjustment is faster than in the case of a similar 
shock to a credit union that is initially well capitalized. By contrast, for the 2009-12 sub-period 
the adjustment is slower for a credit union that is initially adequately capitalized or below than it 
is for one that is well capitalized.  
For credit unions that were initially well capitalized, neither the introduction of PCA, nor 
the financial crisis, appears to have made much difference to the capital-adjustment process. For 
credit unions that were initially adequately capitalized and below, there was little change in the 
speed of adjustment following the introduction of PCA. There was, however, a marked reduction 
in the speed of adjustment in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The estimates for the sub-
                                                 
27
 The differences between these estimated rates of mean reversion are statistically significant in all cases. A z-test 
of the hypothesis  
2
1
1
1   in [2] (equivalent to  
2
m
1
m ), interpreted as the condition that the rates of 
mean reversion are the same for well capitalized credit unions and credit unions adequately capitalized and below, 
1995-2000, yields a z-statistic of 10.7 (p-value=.000). The test of 
4
1
3
1   in [2], as above for 2000-08, yields 
z=8.21 (p=.000); and the test of 
6
1
5
1   in [2], as above for 2009-12, yields z=2.22 (p=.026). An F-test of 
5
1
3
1
1
1   in [2], interpreted as the condition that the rates of mean reversion for well capitalized credit unions 
are the same for all three sub-periods, yields F=33.7 (p=.000). Despite these three coefficients being qualitatively 
similar the test is highly significant, presumably owing to the large number of observations for well capitalized 
credit unions. The test of 
6
1
4
1
2
1   in [2], as above for credit unions adequately capitalized and below, 
yields F=24.3 (p=.000). 
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periods 1995-2000 and 2000-08 are broadly comparable to those reported for US banks by 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Aggarwal and Jacques (2001);
28
 although the latter report 
substantially smaller rate of mean reversion estimates for banks that were initially 
undercapitalized. These patterns might reflect the narrower range of options for raising new 
capital quickly that is open to credit unions, in comparison with banks.  
Overall, the principal effect of the introduction of the PCA regulatory regime appears to 
have been a sustained reduction in the proportion of credit unions operating with capitalization 
below 7%. This reduction was already underway prior to, and presumably in anticipation of, the 
implementation of PCA in 2000, and the reduction continued until the onset of the financial 
crisis in 2007. The results reported in Table 8 and Figures 1 and 2 suggest, however, that the 
introduction of PCA made little or no difference to the pattern of capital adjustment in response 
to an adverse capitalization shock. Rather, the principal effect of PCA appears to have been 
deterrence: credit unions became less likely to reach a state requiring regulatory intervention.  
Initially US credit unions appeared to have weathered the financial crisis better than the 
banks, with no sharp deterioration in the strength of balance sheets across the industry as a whole 
having been apparent in 2007 and 2008. A marked deterioration was recorded in 2009, however, 
from which recovery was far from complete at the time of writing. In the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, there was little change in the pattern of adjustment to an adverse capitalization 
shock for credit unions classified as well capitalized. A marked change was observed for credit 
unions in the adequately capitalized and below category, however, with the speed of mean 
                                                 
28
 The estimations reported by Shrieves and Dahl (1992, p452, Table III) imply a corresponding rate of mean 
reversion measure of 0.942 for US banks with capitalization above the mid-1980s regulatory threshold (7% equity 
capital-to-assets ratio), and 0.729 for banks below this threshold. Accordingly, the rate of mean reversion is slower 
for the former category, and faster for the latter. The corresponding estimates for the Tier 1 leverage ratio reported 
by Aggarwal and Jacques (2001, p1151, Table III) are: 0.857, 0.888, 0.895 for well capitalized banks in 1991, 1992 
and 1993, respectively; 0.834, 0.771, 0.773 for adequately capitalized banks; and 0.637, 0.220, 0.565 for 
undercapitalized banks (same three years). 
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reversion following an adverse capitalization shock being sharply reduced. In other words, credit 
unions in this latter category have, in general, struggled to improve their capitalization since 
2009. The ability of the PCA regulatory regime to facilitate rapid recovery in the event of a 
negative capitalization shock for credit unions in the adequately capitalized and below category 
appears to have come under considerable strain in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  
 
6.2  Other influences on capital adjustment 
In the estimation reported in the first column of Table 7 using the data for all credit 
unions, the coefficient on )yˆ(/)yˆ( * t,i
*
t,i  , a positive and significant coefficient on the inverse 
Mills ratio, generated from the probit regression (Table 6), indicates that common unobservables 
impact on both the capital-to-assets ratio and the survival probability. Accordingly, the inclusion 
of the sample selection correction in the capital-adjustment equation mitigates the survivorship 
bias that would otherwise arise. Estimation of [2] with the sample-selection correction omitted 
produces values of the rate of mean reversion measure 

3
1m
j
m  that are smaller than those reported 
in Table 8 (implying a faster speed of adjustment) for each j=1,…,4.29 
The coefficients on the lagged first and second differences of capitalization, j11  and 
j
12   
in [2], reflect the short-run dynamics of capital adjustment: the responsiveness of ki,t to ki,t–1 
                                                 
29
 For j=1, the estimated rates of mean reversion are 0.8702 (estimation without the sample-selection correction) and 
0.8735 (estimation with the correction). For j=2, the corresponding estimated rates of mean reversion are 0.6860 
(without) and 0.7041 (with); for j=3, 0.8627 (without) and 0.8643 (with); for j=4, 0.6995 (without) and 0.7045 
(with); for j=5, 0.8708 (without) and 0.8717 (with); and for j=6, 0.9403 (without) and 0.9462 (with). Although the 
exclusion of the sample-selection correction does not seem to carry any serious qualitative implications for the 
estimation of the capital-adjustment equation, these results suggest that exclusion introduces a modest downward 
bias into the estimated coefficients on the lagged dependent variable in the capitalization regression. The sample-
selection correction attributes some of the variation in capitalization to a survivorship effect. Exclusion of this 
correction therefore increases the unexplained proportion of the variation in capitalization, making the latter appear 
more random, and making capitalization appear less highly autocorrelated. 
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and ki,t–2. The specification of [2] is based on an assumption that 
j
11  and 
j
12  are the same for 
positive and negative values of ki,t–1 and ki,t–2, respectively. We examine the implications of 
relaxing this assumption by introducing additional dummy variables into [2] to allow for 
variation in the coefficients on ki,t–1 and ki,t–2, depending upon whether the latter are positive 
or negative. The following commentary focuses on the coefficients on ki,t–1 in the case of well 
capitalized credit unions. A positive coefficient suggests a tendency for a positive short-run 
persistence effect (the same direction of capital adjustment between consecutive six-month 
periods), while a negative coefficient suggests a tendency for negative persistence (reversal in 
the direction of adjustment).  
For j=1 (well capitalized, 1995-2000), a coefficient on ki,t–1 in Table 7 of -.2999 is 
replaced by coefficients of -.4337 for ki,t–10 and -.1466 for ki,t–1<0. The larger absolute 
magnitude of the coefficient for ki,t–10 indicates that the negative persistence effect is stronger 
for positive changes in capitalization than it is for negative changes. For j=3 (well capitalized, 
2000-2008), a coefficient on ki,t–1 in Table 7 of -.0478 is replaced by coefficients of -.2199 for 
ki,t–10 and .0697 for ki,t–1<0. For j=5 (well capitalized, 2009-2012), a coefficient on ki,t–1 in 
Table 7 of .0347 is replaced by coefficients of -.0279 for ki,t–10 and .0533 for ki,t–1<0.
30
  
In the estimation using the data for all credit unions, negative coefficients on ci,t–m 
reflect a tendency for an increase in lending to place downward pressure on the capital-to-assets 
ratio, through an increase in the assets denominator. Negative coefficients on ni,t–m imply that 
                                                 
30
 For credit unions adequately capitalized or below the pattern is less consistent, presumably owing to the smaller 
numbers of observations on which the coefficient estimates are based. For j=2 (1995-2000), a coefficient on ki,t–1 in 
Table 7 of -.1689 is replaced by very similar estimates of -.1680 for ki,t–10 and -.1691 for ki,t–1<0. For j=4 (2000-
2008), a coefficient on ki,t–1 in Table 7 of .0413 is replaced by coefficients of -.0026 for ki,t–10 and .0423 for 
ki,t–1<0. For j=6 (2009-2012), a coefficient on ki,t–1 in Table 7 of .0451 is replaced by coefficients of .2491 for 
ki,t–10 and -.0087 for ki,t–1<0. 
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an increase in the non-performing loans ratio is associated with a subsequent decrease in the 
capital-to-assets ratio, as capital is destroyed by the losses arising from the eventual write-offs. 
Negative coefficients on ei,t–m support the hypothesis that a credit union that has difficulty in 
containing its operating costs may encounter difficulties in maintaining adequate capitalization.  
The coefficient on gi,t–1 is large and positive, and the coefficient on gi,t–2 is small and 
negative. Unlike banks, credit unions do not have the option of raising new capital in the form of 
equity. Credit unions might therefore be expected to adopt a more cautious approach than banks 
to the management of their capital over the course of the economic cycle. This might explain the 
observed empirical tendency for capital-to-assets ratios to vary pro-cyclically. Our results concur 
with recent evidence that credit unions face relatively low exposure to business-cycle 
fluctuations, and are relatively robust to macroeconomic shocks (Smith and Woodbury, 2010).
31
 
Finally, significant negative coefficients on intercept-shift dummy variables in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis (2009-12), for both credit unions with ki.t–10.07 and those with ki,t–1<0.07 
(not reported in Table 7), reflect a deterioration in the capitalization of the credit union industry 
as a whole that is also apparent in the descriptive statistics reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4. 
                                                 
 
31
 One-tail z-tests of null hypotheses of zero restrictions on the sums of the coefficients on the lagged differences of 
c, n, e and g produce the following results: test β11+β12=0 (sum of coefficients on ci,t-1 and ci,t-2 = 0), z=-7.56, 
p=0.000; test β21+β22=0 (sum of coefficients on n,t-1 and ni,t-2 = 0), z=-14.9, p=0.000; test β31+β32=0 (sum of 
coefficients on ei,t-1 and ei,t-2 = 0), z=-8.57, p=0.000; test β41+β42=0 (sum of coefficients on gi,t-1 and gi,t-2 = 0), 
z=7.56, p=0.000. These results indicate that permanent changes in the rates of growth of loans, non-performing 
loans ratio, or ratio of non-interest expenses to assets would produce a reduction in the equilbrium capital-to-assets 
ratio; and a permanent change in the rate of growth of gross state product would produce an increase in the 
equilbrium capital-to-assets ratio.   
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6.3  Capital adjustment for credit unions by 1994 assets size band, and post-1994 
 entrants  
The remaining columns of Table 7 report estimations for credit unions in each of five 
assets size bands defined using 1994 data, and for a (smaller) sixth group comprising subsequent 
entrants. Survival rates are highly dependent on assets size: only 25.4% of the credit unions in 
the smallest 1994 assets size band survived until 2012, while 83.6% of the credit unions in the 
largest 1994 assets size band survived.  
For credit unions classified as well capitalized (ki,t–10.07), the coefficients on 1t,i
j
t,i kI   
and mt,i
j
t,i kI   suggest that the rate of mean reversion in capital adjustment is faster for credit 
unions in the smallest and largest assets size bands, and slower for credit unions of intermediate 
size. For credit unions that are adequately capitalized or below (ki,t–1<0.07), there is more 
variation in these coefficients, presumably due to sampling error with relatively few observations 
in some cells. The rate of mean reversion for this group, both before and after the introduction of 
PCA, is fastest in the smallest assets size band.  
We conjecture that the pattern for well capitalized credit unions might reflect a u-shaped 
relationship between the proportion of loans in a credit union’s assets portfolio, and its capital 
adjustment speed. In 2012, the average loans-to-assets ratios of credit unions classified by 
percentiles of the assets size distribution were as follows: 0.425 (below p10, the 10
th
 percentile of 
the assets size distribution), 0.479 (p10-p25), 0.465 (p25-p50), 0.504 (p50-p75), 0.565 (p75-
p90), and 0.594 (above p90). Over most of the assets size distribution, a credit union with a 
higher loans-to-assets ratio, and therefore a relatively low proportion of investments in its assets 
portfolio, is likely to adjust more slowly to an adverse capitalization shock, because it has lesser 
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capacity to adjust its balance sheet quickly by buying or selling investments. At the upper end of 
the size distribution, however, this pattern is not maintained: the largest credit unions are able to 
achieve enhanced flexibility in managing their loans portfolios through engagement with 
secondary loan markets: for example, buying and selling shares in syndicated loans, or trading 
real estate mortgage loans in secondary markets.  
In the estimations for credit unions in each of the five 1994 assets size bands, the 
coefficients on the inverse Mills ratio are positive and significant for all but the smallest size 
band. In general, the importance of the sample-selection effect increases with assets size.
32
 The 
coefficients on ci,t–m are negative and predominantly significant. The coefficients on ni,t–m are 
predominantly negative, and significant in the estimations for the larger assets size bands. All 
coefficients on ei,t–1 and several of the coefficients on ei,t–2 are negative and significant. The 
coefficients on gi,t–1 are positive and significant, indicating that the capitalization of credit 
unions in all asset size bands is pro-cyclical. The coefficients on gi,t–2 are negative and 
significant for the larger size bands, and insignificant for the smaller size bands. Large variations 
in the magnitudes of several of the estimated coefficients for the post-1994 entrants should be 
interpreted with caution in view of the small number of observations for this estimation.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
This study examines the capital-adjustment process for US credit unions before and after 
the implementation of capital requirements and PCA in 2000. Given that the credit unions 
                                                 
32
 These results suggest that the link between survivorship and capitalization is stronger for large than for small 
credit unions. Our conjecture is that the survival or disappearance of large credit unions is likely to be driven 
primarily by their capitalization. For smaller credit unions, by contrast, other factors may be paramount: for 
example, a small credit union might be acquired and absorbed into another credit union if its common bond becomes 
obsolete owing to the closure of the employer of its members, or because its present management wishes to retire.  
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decreased by over one-third during the 1994-2012 observation period, the capital-adjustment 
model estimated includes a control for survivorship bias (derived from a probit regression for the 
probabilities of survival or disappearance for each credit union in each six-month time period). 
The model also allows for different capital-adjustment speeds for well and adequately capitalized 
credit unions both before and after the implementation of PCA and in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis of the late-2000s. 
According to the probit regression, larger credit unions are more likely to survive than 
smaller ones, and younger credit unions are more likely to survive than older ones. Other 
characteristics that increase the probability of survival include a high capital-to-assets ratio, a 
low liquid assets-to-assets ratio, a low non-performing loans ratio, a high loans-to-assets ratio, 
and a low ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets.  
In the estimated capital-adjustment regression, credit union capitalization is mean-
reverting around a long-run average value that has varied over time. The introduction of the PCA 
regulatory regime appears to have achieved a sustained reduction in the proportion of credit 
unions operating with capitalization below 7%. PCA appears to have exerted a deterrent effect, 
such that credit unions became less likely to reach a state requiring regulatory intervention. 
However, PCA seems to have made little or no difference to the pattern of adjustment following 
an adverse capitalization shock. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, there was little change to 
the pattern of capital adjustment for credit unions classified as well capitalized; but for credit 
unions in the adequately capitalized and below category, the speed of recovery following an 
adverse capitalization shock was sharply reduced.  
Credit union capitalization is found to vary pro-cyclically. This suggests that credit 
unions may manage their capital cautiously over the business cycle, in the absence of an option 
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to raise new capital in the form of equity. By accumulating capital when it is easiest to do so 
during an economic upturn, there is more scope for capital to be depleted through write-offs 
during a subsequent downturn. This (along with constraints on asset and funding diversification) 
may explain why credit unions generally weathered the financial crisis of the late-2000s better 
than many commercial banks.  
Overall, the findings of this study suggest that credit unions have for the most part been 
strongly capitalized, and have maintained capital above the threshold required by the PCA 
framework instituted in 2000. Nevertheless, the recent financial crisis has placed severe 
downward pressure on capitalization, leading to an increase in the number of credit unions 
triggering supervisory actions by the regulator in order to restore net worth. The ongoing 
legislative agenda in US Congress is likely to lead to regulatory change which will provide a new 
risk-based capital regime alongside existing leverage arrangements. This is likely to provide 
credit unions with more flexibility in the forms of capital held, and increase their ability to meet 
regulatory minima when changes in economic conditions (and resultant shocks to balance sheets) 
occur.  
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Table 1   Definitions of variables 
The table provides definitions of the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
si,t = natural logarithm of Total Assets [ASSET] for i = 1,...,N, t = 1995.2 to 2010.2;  
ki,t = Capital-to-Assets ratio = Net Worth [NW]/Total Assets;  
qi,t = Liquid Assets [LIQ]/ Total Assets;  
ni,t = Non-performing Loans [NP] / Total Assets;  
xi,t = Loans [LOAN]/ Total Assets;  
ei,t = Non-interest Expense [NIE] / Total Assets;  
ai,t = natural logarithm of Age;  
ci,t = natural logarithm of Loans;  
gi,t = natural logarithm of Gross State Product;  
Ds,i,t (for s=1995.2,...,2012.2) are 0-1 dummy variables for each semi-annual observation;    
1I1 t,i   if credit union i has ki,t–10.07, for t=1995.2 to 2000.1 inclusive, 0 otherwise;  
1I2t,i   if credit union i has ki,t–1<0.07, for t=1995.2 to 2000.1 inclusive, 0 otherwise;  
1I3 t,i   if credit union i has ki,t–10.07, for t=2000.2 to 2008.2 inclusive, 0 otherwise; 
1I4t,i   if credit union i has ki,t–1<0.07, for t=2000.2 to 2008.2 inclusive, 0 otherwise; 
1I5 t,i   if credit union i has ki,t–10.07, for t=2009.1 to 2012.2 inclusive, 0 otherwise; 
1I6 t,i   if credit union i has ki,t–1<0.07, for t=2009.1 to 2012.2 inclusive, 0 otherwise; 
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Table 2   Descriptive statistics 
 
The table reports the number of credit unions and the mean values of key variables by year. 
 
 Number of 
credit unions 
ASSET NW/ASSET LIQ/ASSET NP/LOAN LOAN/ASSET NIE/ASSET LOAN GSP 
Dec 94 12046 24.2 .127 .0384 .00432 .615 .0200 .0000 .0651 
Dec 95 11741 26.3 .134 .0403 .00435 .644 .0208 .0679 .0513 
Dec 96 11437 28.7 .140 .0377 .00430 .651 .0216 .0489 .0560 
Dec 97 11240 31.3 .145 .0380 .00426 .651 .0223 .0358 .0618 
Dec 98 10986 35.4 .145 .0397 .00430 .617 .0218 .0088 .0576 
Dec 99 10621 38.8 .148 .0994 .00397 .625 .0179 .0454 .0532 
Dec 00 10308 42.6 .145 .1094 .00387 .662 .0201 .0778 .0528 
Dec 01 9976 50.4 .138 .1573 .00411 .600 .0192 .0034 .0312 
Dec 02 9679 58.0 .135 .1559 .00419 .570 .0188 .0117 .0342 
Dec 03 9360 65.6 .133 .1631 .00408 .553 .0187 .0169 .0458 
Dec 04 9007 72.4 .136 .1409 .00385 .564 .0190 .0364 .0620 
Dec 05 8684 78.7 .143 .1207 .00390 .595 .0198 .0488 .0574 
Dec 06 8352 85.6 .151 .1199 .00310 .618 .0208 .0291 .0574 
Dec 07 8089 93.8 .155 .1285 .00314 .614 .0213 .0096 .0467 
Dec 08 7792 104.5 .151 .1251 .00365 .586 .0208 -.0040 .0363 
Dec 09 7540 117.3 .138 .1408 .00389 .552 .0199 .0080 -.0144 
Dec 10 7327 124.8 .134 .1468 .00402 .530 .0216 -.0198 .0295 
Dec 11 7086 135.7 .132 .1530 .00369 .510 .0205 -.0099 .0409 
Dec 12 6814 149.9 .131 .1463 .00323 .501 .0195 .0091 .0384 
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Table 3  Credit union capitalization, 1994-2012   
 
The table reports the mean and the standard deviation of capital-to-assets ratio (ratio of net worth to total assets) by year, and the proportions of credit unions 
in various bands defined by capital-to-assets ratio 
 
 Mean, ki,t Standard 
deviation, ki,t 
Proportion  
ki,t<0.07 
Proportion 
0.07 ki,t<0.10 
Proportion 
0.10 ki,t<0.13 
Proportion 
0.13 ki,t<0.16 
Proportion 
0.16 ki,t<0.19 
Proportion 
0.19ki,t 
Dec 94 .127 .059 .083 .251 .289 .179 .088 .109 
Dec 95 .134 .060 .058 .221 .295 .189 .106 .132 
Dec 96 .140 .062 .043 .187 .294 .205 .116 .154 
Dec 97 .145 .064 .037 .161 .281 .221 .127 .173 
Dec 98 .145 .066 .040 .169 .283 .207 .127 .174 
Dec 99 .148 .066 .032 .155 .276 .220 .134 .184 
Dec 00 .145 .066 .033 .194 .274 .200 .120 .179 
Dec 01 .138 .065 .039 .247 .275 .183 .106 .149 
Dec 02 .135 .061 .028 .273 .288 .181 .095 .135 
Dec 03 .133 .061 .027 .282 .297 .176 .093 .126 
Dec 04 .136 .061 .022 .258 .303 .185 .101 .131 
Dec 05 .143 .064 .020 .202 .305 .196 .116 .161 
Dec 06 .151 .067 .015 .161 .288 .211 .125 .200 
Dec 07 .155 .071 .014 .151 .274 .207 .135 .219 
Dec 08 .151 .072 .020 .184 .272 .200 .122 .202 
Dec 09 .138 .072 .052 .274 .253 .164 .093 .164 
Dec 10 .134 .070 .049 .302 .258 .158 .088 .145 
Dec 11 .132 .067 .047 .317 .265 .153 .082 .136 
Dec 12 .131 .066 .036 .327 .281 .151 .078 .127 
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Table 4 Average credit union capitalization by asset size band, 1994-2012    
 
The table reports the average value of total assets, and the average value of the capital-to-assets ratio, within subgroups defined by percentiles of the asset size 
distribution in each December 
 
 Average assets ($m) in subgroups by percentiles of  
assets size distribution 
Average capital-to-assets ratios in subgroups by percentiles of  
assets size distribution 
 above 
p90 
p75-p90 p50-p75 p25-p50 p10-p25 below 
p10 
above 
p90 
p75-p90 p50-p75 p25-p50 p10-p25 below 
p10 
Dec 94 170.9 27.4 8.8 2.77 .872 .239 .113 .112 .118 .126 .139 .175 
Dec 95 186.6 29.5 9.3 2.93 .917 .254 .112 .116 .123 .135 .151 .183 
Dec 96 204.4 32.0 10.1 3.18 .980 .268 .118 .121 .130 .141 .158 .189 
Dec 97 223.9 34.7 10.9 3.37 1.027 .274 .120 .124 .135 .147 .164 .195 
Dec 98 254.9 38.8 12.1 3.72 1.113 .293 .119 .121 .133 .148 .167 .199 
Dec 99 279.4 42.1 13.3 4.12 1.238 .320 .128 .127 .136 .149 .169 .199 
Dec 00 309.2 45.5 14.2 4.34 1.301 .333 .112 .120 .134 .149 .168 .195 
Dec 01 367.6 53.0 16.6 5.09 1.499 .371 .107 .114 .126 .140 .161 .193 
Dec 02 426.6 59.9 18.6 5.74 1.697 .404 .106 .113 .125 .137 .155 .186 
Dec 03 484.6 67.2 20.7 6.41 1.896 .439 .106 .112 .124 .134 .151 .184 
Dec 04 537.1 73.5 22.3 6.89 2.068 .471 .110 .115 .127 .138 .154 .184 
Dec 05 588.4 79.1 23.5 7.14 2.138 .483 .112 .118 .133 .147 .164 .194 
Dec 06 646.4 84.2 24.7 7.33 2.182 .499 .116 .122 .139 .157 .177 .204 
Dec 07 714.3 90.5 26.2 7.68 2.273 .516 .116 .124 .142 .163 .183 .213 
Dec 08 795.2 100.7 29.1 8.56 2.523 .552 .111 .119 .137 .159 .178 .214 
Dec 09 889.5 114.8 33.1 9.60 2.832 .602 .099 .105 .123 .143 .166 .208 
Dec 10 948.0 121.3 35.2 10.32 3.069 .639 .101 .105 .119 .138 .161 .203 
Dec 11 1031.9 131.3 38.2 11.17 3.317 .693 .102 .105 .117 .135 .155 .197 
Dec 12 1139.6 145.7 42.0 12.24 3.660 .747 .105 .106 .116 .134 .153 .194 
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Table 5 Entrants and exits, 1995-2012 
 
The table reports the number of credit unions entering and exiting by year. Exits are classified as follows: acquisition; purchase and assumption; liquidation; 
conversion to bank; conversion to privately insured credit union; and unclassified. The table also reports the exit rate and the number of live credit unions at 
the end of each year. 
 
 Entrants Acquisition Purchase & 
Assumption 
Liquidation Conversion 
to bank 
Conversion 
to privately 
insured 
Unclassified 
disappearance 
Total exits Exit rate Number 
live at end 
of year 
1994 - - - - - - - - - 12046 
1995 13 290 5 22 1 0 0 318 .0264 11741 
1996 20 293 11 17 1 1 1 324 .0276 11437 
1997 19 192 4 17 0 0 3 216 .0189 11240 
1998 8 215 5 28 3 0 11 262 .0233 10986 
1999 12 335 11 24 3 0 4 377 .0343 10621 
2000 13 292 13 18 3 0 0 326 .0307 10308 
2001 10 296 8 25 6 5 2 342 .0332 9976 
2002 6 265 7 23 1 3 4 303 .0304 9679 
2003 15 315 5 10 2 0 2 334 .0345 9360 
2004 3 332 6 11 3 4 0 356 .0380 9007 
2005 8 302 1 25 2 1 0 331 .0367 8684 
2006 10 313 2 23 1 3 0 342 .0394 8352 
2007 4 248 2 10 3 4 0 267 .0320 8089 
2008 4 275 1 19 1 4 1 301 .0372 7792 
2009 4 229 1 23 1 0 2 256 .0329 7540 
2010 5 190 7 19 0 2 0 218 .0289 7327 
2011 1 217 1 20 0 1 3 242 .0330 7086 
2012 4 258 0 15 0 1 2 276 .0390 6814 
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Table 6   Probit regression for survival or non-survival 
 
The table reports estimates of coefficients in equation [1]. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable, coded 0 for non-survival and 1 for survival between time t–1 and time t. z-statistics for 
significance of estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. 0-1 dummy variables for each 6-
month observation period are included in the probit regression; these coefficients are not reported. 
 
The probit regression is estimated over 34 six-month periods (Jan/Jun 1995 to Jul/Dec 2012, 
inclusive). Non-survival comprises the categories Acquisition, Purchase & Assumption, Liquidation 
and Unclassified Disappearance, as reported in Table 5. The categories Conversion to Bank and 
Conversion to Privately Insured are treated as right-censored in the probit regression.  
 
Variable definitions as follows: si,t = natural logarithm of assets; ki,t = capital-to-assets ratio; qi,t = 
liquid assets-to-assets ratio; ni,t = non-performing loans-to-loans ratio; xi,t = loans-to-assets ratio; ei,t = 
non-interest expenses-to-assets ratio; ai,t = natural logarithm of age. 
 
 
Covariates Coefficients Covariates Coefficients 
si,t–1 .1696
*** xi, t–1 .1093
*** 
 (42.7)  (3.29) 
ki,t–1 1.1296
*** ei, t–1 -6.3859
*** 
 (15.0)  (-28.2) 
qi, t–1 -.5008
*** ai, t–1 -.1029
*** 
 (-11.1)  (-7.42) 
ni, t–1 -.8936
*** No. observations 311,576 
 (-5.98) No. disappearances 4,812 
 
Note 
*** 
denotes statistically different from zero, 1% level, two-tail test; 
** 
5% level; 
*
 10% level. 
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Table 7  Fixed-effects regressions for capital adjustment 
 
The table reports estimates of coefficients in equation [2]. The dependent variable is ki,t. z-statistics 
for significance of estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. The specification allows for 
different intercepts (not reported) for credit unions that were well capitalized (ki,t–10.07), and for 
those that were adequately capitalized or below (ki,t–1<0.07), for each of three subperiods: 1995.2-
2000.1, 2000.2-2008.2, and 2009.1-2012.2 (referred to below as 1995-2000, 2000-08 and 2009-12). 
 
Variable definitions as follows: ki,t = capital-to-assets ratio; ci,t = natural logarithm of loans; ni,t = non-
performing loans-to-total loans ratio; qi,t = liquid assets-to-total assets ratio; ei,t = non-interest 
expenses to assets ratio; gi,t = natural logarithm of Gross State Product; 1I
1
t,i   if ki,t–10.07 for 1995-
2000; 1I2t,i   if ki,t–1<0.07 for 1995-2000; 1I
3
t,i   if ki,t–10.07 for 2000-08; 1I
4
t,i   if ki,t–1<0.07 for 
2000-08; 1I5 t,i   if ki,t–10.07 for 2009-12; 1I
6
t,i   if ki,t–1<0.07 for 2009-12; 
*
t,iy  is the latent 
variable from the probit regression for disappearance/survival (see equation [1] and Table 6). 
 
F1 is the test for the joint significance of all estimated coefficients. F2 is the test of the hypothesis that 
the corresponding coefficients on 
1t,i
j
t,i kI  , 1t,i
j
t,i kI   and 2t,i
j
t,i kI   are the same for the categories 
well capitalized, and adequately capitalized and below, for the period 1995-2000 (j=1,2). F3 is the test 
of the same hypothesis for the period 2000-08 (j=3,4). F4 is the test of the same hypothesis for the 
period 2009-12 (j=5,6). F5 is the test of the hypothesis that the corresponding coefficients on ki,t-1, 
ki,t-1 and ki,t-2 are the same for the periods 1995-2000, 2000-08 and 2009-12 for the category well 
capitalized (j=1,3,5). F6 is the test of the same hypothesis for the category adequately capitalized and 
below (j=2,4,6).  
 
 
 
Covariates: 
All Percentiles of June 1994 asset size distribution Post-94 
entrants >p80 p60-p80 p40-p60 p20-p40 <p20 
1t,i
1
t,i kI   
-.1265
***
 -.1276
***
 -.1109
***
 -.1113
***
 -.1175
***
 -.1430
***
 -.4320
***
 
(-79.42) (-50.49) (-43.79) (-37.81) (-32.14) (-26.37) (-6.36) 
1t,i
1
t,i kI   
-.2999
***
 -.2358
***
 -.2784
***
 -.2940
***
 -.3093
***
 -.3095
***
 -.3058
***
 
(-88.89) (-43.29) (-44.62) (-44.69) (-38.37) (-30.29) (-4.69) 
2t,i
1
t,i kI   
.0563
***
 .0295
***
 .0311
***
 .0568
***
 .0875
***
 .0617
***
 .0949
*
 
(17.61) (5.74) (5.45) (8.81) (11.65) (6.35) (1.87) 
1t,i
2
t,i kI   
-.2959
***
 -.1888
***
 -.1900
***
 -.1292
***
 -.4227
***
 -.4972
***
 .1584 
(-18.82) (-4.88) (-6.46) (-4.71) (-12.72) (-7.68) (1.48) 
1t,i
2
t,i kI   
-.1689
***
 -.1058
***
 -.1310
***
 -.1701
***
 -.0284 -.2418
***
 -.0778 
(-14.79) (-4.04) (-6.86) (-7.40) (-1.01) (-6.33) (-1.10) 
2t,i
2
t,i kI   
-.0031 .0210 -.0103 .0017 .1240
***
 .0085 -.0505
*
 
(-0.36) (1.10) (-0.66) (0.08) (4.53) (0.26) (-1.85) 
1t,i
3
t,i kI   
-.1357
***
 -.1699
***
 -.1232
***
 -.1173
***
 -.1191
***
 -.1522
***
 -.4777
***
 
(-99.47) (-70.88) (-55.51) (-46.40) (-38.72) (-33.01) (-14.49) 
1t,i
3
t,i kI   
-.0478
***
 .0118
**
 -.0301
***
 -.0422
***
 .0135
*
 -.0625
***
 -.2402
***
 
(-14.30) (2.18) (-4.92) (-6.11) (1.78) (-5.93) (-7.03) 
2t,i
3
t,i kI   
.1705
***
 .0223
***
 .2054
***
 .2441
***
 .2768
***
 .1527
***
 .0326 
(51.24) (4.42) (34.13) (35.51) (34.58) (14.64) (1.11) 
1t,i
4
t,i kI   
-.2955
***
 -.0748
**
 -.0407 -.2437
***
 -.2770
***
 -.6240
***
 -.3061
***
 
(-14.39) (-1.99) (-0.90) (-6.68) (-3.95) (-6.52) (-3.90) 
1t,i
4
t,i kI   
.0413
***
 .0394 .2299
***
 .1487
***
 -.0533 .0552 .0518 
(3.50) (1.32) (7.18) (6.90) (-1.61) (1.56) (0.76) 
2t,i
4
t,i kI   
.0178 .0191 .0625
**
 .0248 .0916
***
 -.0524 .0968
*
 
(1.36) (0.76) (2.28) (1.17) (2.58) (-1.07) (1.65) 
1t,i
5
t,i kI   
-.1283
***
 -.1699
***
 -.1239
***
 -.1086
***
 -.1136
***
 -.1315
***
 -.3216
***
 
(-88.36) (-59.96) (-53.26) (-41.57) (-33.67) (-25.03) (-6.87) 
1t,i
5
t,i kI   
.0347
***
 .1428
***
 .0200
*
 -.0013 .0242 .0402
**
 .0687 
(5.80) (12.71) (1.88) (-0.10) (1.59) (2.31) (1.06) 
 40 
2t,i
5
t,i kI   
.2451
***
 .1726
***
 .2489
***
 .2319
***
 .3016
***
 .2576
***
 .0712
*
 
(39.75) (16.16) (24.17) (19.54) (20.53) (12.40) (1.67) 
1t,i
6
t,i kI   
-.0538
*
 -.0691
**
 -.0359 .1020 .2165
**
 .1025 -.2570 
(-1.65) (-2.35) (-0.66) (1.54) (2.15) (0.45) (-1.37) 
1t,i
6
t,i kI   
.0451 .4418
***
 .2020
***
 .1527
***
 .0159 -.3533
***
 -.8106
***
 
(1.60) (13.46) (4.58) (2.95) (0.19) (-2.88) (-3.97) 
2t,i
6
t,i kI   
.1560
***
 .0304 .0064 .0793 .4431
***
 -.1223 -.0819 
(5.29) (0.88) (0.14) (1.57) (6.37) (-0.65) (-0.48) 
ci,t–1 
-.0049
***
 -.0054
***
 -.0026
***
 -.0014
**
 -.0029
***
 -.0082
***
 .0011 
(-17.61) (-9.35) (-5.26) (-2.12) (-3.67) (-10.45) (0.56) 
ci,t-2 
-.0007
***
 -.0029
***
 -.0025
***
 -.0028
***
 -.0012 -.0004 -.0004 
(-2.69) (-5.02) (-5.24) (-4.37) (-1.48) (-0.55) (-0.32) 
ni,t–1 
-.0140
***
 -.0434
**
 -.0187
*
 -.0131 -.0137
*
 -.0068 -.0953
***
 
(-6.54) (-2.56) (-1.92) (-1.56) (-1.66) (-1.52) (-2.80) 
ni,t–2 
-.0157
***
 -.0806
***
 -.0423
***
 -.0195
**
 -.0001 -.0108
**
 -.1295
***
 
(-7.02) (-4.60) (-4.26) (-2.29) (-0.01) (-2.32) (-3.66) 
ei,t–1 
-.1602
***
 -.2128
***
 -.0797
***
 -.2127
***
 -.2632
***
 -.1509
***
 -.0822
*
 
(-30.75) (-13.72) (-10.68) (-17.64) (-19.00) (-10.00) (-1.88) 
ei,t–2 -.0276
***
 .1485
***
 -.0006 -.0419
***
 -.0752
***
 -.0389
***
 .0129 
 (-5.49) (9.73) (-0.08) (-3.63) (-5.41) (-2.75) (0.36) 
gi,t–1 
.0438
***
 .0331
***
 .0533
***
 .0537
***
 .0485
***
 -.0003 .0350 
(17.19) (11.52) (16.46) (12.52) (7.41) (-0.02) (0.60) 
gi,t–2 -.0267
***
 -.0488
***
 -.0366
***
 -.0251
***
 -.0083 .0147 -.0468 
 (-10.84) (-17.79) (-11.69) (-6.04) (-1.31) (1.07) (-0.84) 
)yˆ(/)yˆ( * t,i
*
t,i   .0355*** .2548*** .0599*** .0648*** .0731*** .0087* -.0005 
 (18.02) (22.85) (13.01) (11.03) (11.92) (1.75) (-0.03) 
No. observations 294,204 70,767 67,293 60,585 52,371 41,349 1,839 
No. credit unions 11,865 2,421 2,422 2,388 2,320 2,170 144 
F1 1284.0
***
 
.000 
466.7
***
 
.000 
389.9
***
 
.000 
353.0
***
 
.000 
267.0
***
 
.000 
146.9
***
 
.000 
29.0
***
 
.000 
F2 111.8
***
 
.000 
10.5
***
 
.000 
32.6
***
 
.000 
16.4
***
 
.000 
47.1
***
 
.000 
12.3
***
 
.000 
15.3
***
 
.000 
F3 90.2
***
 
.000 
5.25
***
 
.001 
44.3
***
 
.000 
82.5
***
 
.000 
13.0
***
 
.000 
16.8
***
 
.000 
9.54
***
 
.000 
F4 4.27
***
 
.005 
37.4
***
 
.000 
15.6
***
 
.000 
10.9
***
 
.000 
6.99
***
 
.000 
4.09
***
 
.007 
6.67
***
 
.000 
F5 698.2
***
 
.000 
322.5
***
 
.000 
208.8
***
 
.000 
175.8
***
 
.000 
182.2
***
 
.000 
84.4
***
 
.000 
6.92
***
 
.000 
F6 55.5
***
 
.000 
36.6
***
 
.000 
29.1
***
 
.000 
25.6
***
 
.000 
14.7
***
 
.000 
8.30
***
 
.000 
6.22
***
 
.000 
 
 
Note:
 *** 
denotes significant at 1% level, two-tail test; 
** 
5% level; 
*
 10% level. 
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Table 8   Implied coefficients in the levels autoregression for the capital-to-assets ratio, and impulse 
response functions 
 
The table reports estimates of coefficients on the lagged capital-to-assets ratio variables in the levels 
regression for the capital-to-assets ratio, calculated by means of transformation of corresponding 
coefficients reported in the first column of Table 6. With reference to equation [2], the coefficient 
transformations are: 1
j
11
j
1
j
1  ; 
j
12
j
11
j
2   and 
j
12
j
3  , where 
j
s  denotes the 
coefficient on 
st,i
j
t,i kI   in the levels regression.  
 
The impulse response functions show the values of )kk( it,i   for selected t generated by the levels 
autoregression following the introduction of a negative unit shock of vi,0= –1. ki,t denotes credit union 
i’s capital-to-assets ratio, and ik  denotes the long-run mean (equilibrium) value of ki,t. vi,t = 0, ki,t = ik  
for t<0; vi,0 = –1, ki,0 = ik + vi,0; vi,t=0, t,i3t,i
j
32t,i
j
21t,i
j
1it,i vkkkkk    for t>0. 
 
Capitalization: 7% or more Under 7% 7% or more Under 7% 7% or more Under 7% 
       
Period: 1995-2000 1995-2000 2000-2008 2000-2008 2009-2012 2009-2012 
 (j=1) (j=2) (j=3) (j=4) (j=5) (j=6) 
       
Implied coefficients in the levels autoregression for ki,t 
       
1t,i
j
t,i kI   
0.5736 0.5352 0.8165 0.7458 0.9064 0.9913 
2t,i
j
t,i kI   
0.3562 0.1658 0.2183 -0.0235 0.2104 0.1109 
3t,i
j
t,i kI   
-0.0563 0.0031 -0.1705 -0.0178 -0.2451 -0.1560 
       
Sum = 

3
1m
j
m  
0.8735 0.7041 0.8643 0.7045 0.8717 0.9462 
       
Impulse response functions 
       
t = 0 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
     1 -0.57 -0.54 -0.82 -0.75 -0.91 -0.99 
     2 -0.69 -0.45 -0.88 -0.53 -1.03 -1.09  
     3 -0.54 -0.33 -0.73 -0.36 -0.88 -1.04  
     4 -0.52 -0.26 -0.65 -0.24 -0.79 -1.00  
     5 -0.45 -0.19 -0.54 -0.16 -0.65 -0.93  
        
     7 -0.37 -0.11 -0.38 -0.07 -0.43 -0.81  
        
   10 -0.27 -0.05 -0.22 -0.02 -0.21 -0.66  
        
   15 -0.16 -0.01 -0.09 0.00 -0.06 -0.46  
        
   20 -0.09 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.32  
        
Sum 
=  
1t
it,i )kk(  
-7.91 -3.38 -7.36 -3.38 -7.79 -18.59  
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Impulse Response Functions: Well capitalized
 
 
Figure 2 
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Impulse Response Functions: Adequately capitalized and below
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